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SUBJECT: DARFUR: CFC SECOND CHAMBER COLLAPSES

REFS: (A) KHARTOUM 174
(B) KHARTOUM 197

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SUMMARY

¶1. (SBU) In the February 12 Ceasefire Commission First (CFC) Chamber, African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) Force Commander (FC) Aprezi expressed his dissatisfaction with the CFC Secretariat's presentation of cases for the February 7 Joint Commission (JC) meeting. He reviewed his efforts to persuade the Government of Sudan to allow the deployment of non-signatory representatives to sector-level CFCs and made a plea to international observers to consider additional financial support for the Second Chamber. The FC proposed the creation of a "working team" - having roughly the same composition as the CFC, excluding the Government of Sudan - to conduct an analysis of the Government of Sudan Janjaweed disarmament plan, though no structure or timelines were specified. The CFC Second Chamber deliberated the status of reinstating non-signatory representatives to the sectors, with the FC on the one hand pleading for Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and Sudanese Liberation Army/Non-Signatory Faction's (SLA/NSF) patience and the Movements on the other declaring that they would no longer participate in the forum until they received pay and a clear statement of intent from AMIS. Following the meeting, the non-signatories delivered a joint letter affirming their refusal to attend any future meetings. END SUMMARY

INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL ANGLES OF THE CFC

¶2. (SBU) AMIS FC commenced the February 12 session of the CFC with a review of outcomes from the previous week's JC meeting (Ref A). He conveyed extreme dissatisfaction with the performance of the Sec-retariat, particularly with regard to selection of the cases that came before the JC and their manner of presentation, which allowed many of the incidents to be viewed in isolation and dismissed by the parties as "criminal" acts rather than ceasefire violations. Aprezi noted his "embarrassment" of the CFC Secretariat's lack of rigor and that "if the CFC has no integrity then we cannot bring peace to Darfur." The lengthy discussion highlighted the numerous process problems - introducing cases in the CFC, ordering investigations, requesting follow-up information from sectors, disseminating information to CFC participants - that plague the body. To avoid similar confusion in the future, the U.S. observer proposed, and gained consensus, that any documents provided to the JC must be approved by the CFC Chairman or Vice Chairmen.

¶3. (SBU) Questions regarding representation, even within the CFC

First Chamber, persist. JEM-Peace Wing representatives requested that AMIS provide transport for several of their field commanders to Khartoum to resolve internal problems with the political leadership (Ref B). The FC declined the request, pointing out that these were political matters that should be addressed in appropriate channels. He then chastised AU political officer Betty M'gaya (and, indirectly, Deputy Head of Mission Hassan Gibril), for their inertia in facilitating the resolution of these matters through political intervention. (COMMENT: M'gaya could only manage a meek "I serve two masters!" in response to the FC's criticisms. The leadership crisis within the JEM-Peace Wing and its impact on the CFC serve to highlight the divisions that exist between the AMIS military and political structures. The FC states his dislike for intervening in political issues but appears compelled to do so in the absence of any adequate efforts by the Deputy Head of Mission's office. Building political officer capacity should remain a priority for the UN Light Support Package integration. END COMMENT.)

VEHICLE SNATCHING STILL A CONCERN

¶ 14. (SBU) Vehicle snatching remains a top concern for the Force Commander, particularly in light of several successful carjackings involving AMIS. Aprezi delivered a lengthy diatribe aimed primarily at SLA/Minawi, exhorting the SLA to take responsibility for their "areas of control." The FC noted too that while the increase in vehicle thefts is an alarming trend, it may not constitute an act that qualifies as a ceasefire violation. In this vein, he questioned the decision to task Sector 1 with conducting a formal investigation into the January 26 carjacking of a PAE vehicle in El Fasher, stating that it looked more like banditry than a ceasefire violation. The U.S. observer protested a reversal of this decision, pointing out that PAE - unlike NGOs or other organizations supports AMIS and that this single incident was only one of several recent carjackings (or attempts) that occurred in close proximity to AMIS HQ. The FC consented to allow the decision to stand and press

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Sector 1 to carry out its investigation.

JANJAWEED DISARMAMENT

¶ 15. (SBU) Following AMIS' briefing at the JC on the Janjaweed disarmament plan, Aprezi proposed creating a "working team" - having roughly the same composition as the CFC, excluding the Sudanese government - to conduct an analysis of the Janjaweed disarmament plan. This team will present its findings to a similar government team, headed by the government CFC representative, and the two groups will forward their recommendations for approval at the appropriate political level. Beyond the generic discussion of the need for a "real" disarmament plan, there was no concrete talk of timelines, specific objectives or structure to move the process forward. (NOTE: The Government of Sudan Janjaweed disarmament plan is rife with deficiencies, not least of which is its failure to define which groups must be disarmed. The plan, which the Government of Sudan provided to AMIS in July 2006, has not undergone a comprehensive analysis by AMIS or the international community, and no official feedback has been furnished to the Government of Sudan, according to its CFC representative. The U.S. and other shareholders should lend technical expertise to critique the plan and suggest detailed modalities for its implementation and verification. END NOTE.)

CFC SECOND CHAMBER COLLAPSES

¶ 16. (SBU) In the First Chamber, the FC made the case again for establishment of "fully functional" (as called for in the JC communique) CFC Second Chambers at the Sector level. He noted, however, the challenge posed by the proliferation of rebel factions, each one claiming it deserves representation and, therefore, payment of Mission Subsistence Allowance (MSA). Aprezi absorbed comments

from CFC participants on possible ways forward - including reducing MSA, changing the number of representatives per sector or re-distributing representatives based on the presence of their forces - and acknowledged that step one is gaining Government of Sudan agreement to allow the deployment of non-signatories to Sectors, followed by coordination with the international community to fund MSA. The FC remarked that he would go to Khartoum February 15-18 to meet senior GoS military officers and other officials to press his case.

¶7. (SBU) Non-signatory representatives from JEM and SLA/NSF attended the CFC Second Chamber but only "to make their final statements of grievance." Substantive agenda items were not addressed. The Force Commander briefed JEM and SLA/NSF on the results of the JC and his intention to pursue the Second Chamber issue directly with the Government of Sudan and international partners. He expressed confidence that the Government of Sudan would eventually relent but that the issue of funding was in the political sphere and largely out of his control.

¶8. (SBU) The non-signatory representatives, for their part, remained unconvinced by the FC's statements. JEM representative General Bashir declared that they were "fed up" with AMIS' ambiguous pronouncements and impotent efforts to gain any traction on this issue at the political level. Both Bashir and SLA/NSF representative Colonel Abdou Ismael voiced extreme frustration with the perpetual delays in the resolution of their status, pay, facilitation of communications and inclusion in the information chain. They asserted that they would no longer attend Second Chamber meetings until these issues were addressed. On February 13, JEM and SLA/NSF delivered a joint letter officially informing AMIS of their decision to cease participation in the Second Chamber.

COMMENT

¶9. (SBU) The establishment of effective sector-level CFC Second Chambers is an important step in facilitating humanitarian access to non-signatory-controlled areas and in encouraging non-signatory cooperation on potential ceasefire violations. The Government of Sudan claims that they are unable to assure the security of the non-signatories in the field but, in reality it believes the representatives will act as spies. The international community can play a constructive role in this effort by continuing to urge the Government of Sudan to accept the sector-level Second Chamber concept and in following through with sufficient funding. END COMMENT.

HUME